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LSS+ Version 5.0 Updates (June, 2004) The following revisions have been added to LSS+ version 5.0, released in July, 2004. You must review the revisions for Version 4.05 to determine the changes that were made from the original hardbound version of Locks, Safes, and Security (second edition).
Chapter Three
Figure LSS+830 Easyentrie profile milling machine Figure LSS+831 Operation of the Easyentrie profile milling
machine Figure LSS+832 Overview of the process of milling a blank
with the Easyentrie Figure LSS+833 Comparison of source key and blank produced
by the Easyentrie Figure LSS+834 Keys can be produced from a database or
photograph with the Easyentrie Figure LSS+835 Images of keyways can be edited to produce a
modified blank Figure LSS+836 The Keyway King milling machine Figure LSS+837 Different cutting wheels for the Keyway King Figure LSS+838 Milled blanks from the Keyway King
Section 10.2.1.1 add text Figure LSS+1114 KBA for a two-step progression master key
system Figure LSS+1115 KBA for a three level master key system Figure LSS+1116 KBA for a master key system with two master
key chambers progressed Figure LSS+1117 KBA for a master key system with three
change key chambers progressed Figure LSS+1118 KBA for the progression of master and
change keys Figure LSS+1119 Total position progression system to create
sixteen master keys Figure LSS+1120 TPP system designed to create 64 change
keys Figure LSS+1121 MACS violations within a master key system Figure LSS+1122 Pinning chart showing cross-keying within a
master key system Figure LSS+1123 Diagrams showing cross-keying in a master
keyed system Figure LSS+1124 A Key Bitting Analysis table for a total
position progression system Figure LSS+1125 A comparison of a total position
progression system and a rotating constant system Figure LSS+1126 A series of charts shows how a rotating
constant master key system works Figure LSS+1127 Identification of critical components
within a cylinder Figure LSS+1128 Evva DPI dual sidebar lock Figure LSS+1129 KBA division for TPP and partial position
progression Figure LSS+1130 KBA division of key Figure LSS+1131 Total position progression paradigms Figure LSS+1132 Division of key for three and four levels
of keying Figure LSS+1133 Matrix key division Figure LSS+1134 Master ring diagram Figure LSS+1135 Master ring lock, showing altered parity Figure LSS+1136 Master ring and interchangeable core
diagrams Figure LSS+1137 Master ring build-up pin diagram Figure LSS+1138 Best interchangeable core diagram for A2
and A3 lock Figure LSS+1139 Corbin construction master keying system Figure LSS+1140 KBA for Corbin construction master keying
system
Figure LSS+1415 Kromer Convar lever lock Figure LSS+1416 Mauer 70091 lever lock Figure LSS+1417 Ostmarks lever lock Figure LSS+1418 Rosengrens ABN lever lock Figure LSS+1419 STUV lever lock Figure LSS+1420 Rosengrens RKL10 lever lock Reading
wafer locks, courtesy of Harry Sher.
Add text to 17_6.1.5 Schlage primus Figure LSS+1707 Medeco M3 system, showing side millings on
the key Figure LSS+1708 Medeco M3 system, showing the integration
of the sidebar with slider Figure LSS+1709 Schlage Primus keys and side bit milling Figure LSS+1710 Schlage Primus sidebar and gate interaction Figure LSS+1711 Orientation of finger pins within the
Schlage Primus Add section 22_1.11.1 Overview of the system Add section 22_1.11.2 Detailed system operation Add section 22_1.11.3 Security issues Figure LSS+2202 Instakey depth and spacing table for small
format interchangeable core lock Figure LSS+2203 Step key sequence for Instakey cylinder Figure LSS+2204 Pinning chart for sample Instakey lock Figure LSS+2205 Progression chart for Instakey lock, four
cylinders Add section 23_3.9 Smart cards Add section 23_3.9.1 Defeat of smart cards
Marks produced
by methods of entry, courtesy of Harry Sher.
Add section 29_4.7 Cross pick Add section 29_8.1.1 Acoustic Feedback incorporated into
picking tools Add section 29_7.3.3.1 Opening High Security Lever Locks Add section 29_8.2 Schlage Everest Add section 29_8.3 Immobilizing Pin Tumblers
Figure LSS+2931 The MSC cross pick Figure LSS+2932 The MSC Electropick allows controlled
manipulation of pin tumblers. Figure LSS+2933 MSC acoustic picking tool. Figure LSS+2934 Kromer Convar lever lock Figure LSS+2935 Kromer Novum lever lock Figure LSS+2936 Stuv lever lock Figure LSS+2937 Rosengrens ABN1 lever lock Figure LSS+2938 Rosengrens RKL10 lever lock Figure LSS+2939 Markings on levers to aid picking Figure LSS+2940 Axial lock pick and decoding tools by A-1
and Peterson Manufacturing. Figure LSS+2941 The Peterson pick tools for the Schlage
Everest cylinder Figure LSS+2942 A rake pick for a dimple lock
Add section 31_4.9 Other
Means of Deriving Tumbler Combinations Add section 31_4.9.1
Shimming a Pin Tumbler Lock with Depth Keys Add section 31_4.10 Decoding and Extrapolation of Master
Key Systems Add section 31_4.10.1 Introduction Add section 31_4.10.2 Overview of Methods to Compromise a
Master Key System Add section 31_4.10.3 Decoding and Extrapolation of The Top
Level Master Key Add section 31_4.10.3.1 The
Theory of Extrapolation of the TMK Add section 31_4.10.3.2 Overview of the Process Add section 31_4.10.3.3 Security
of Master Key Systems Add section 31_4.10.3.4
How Do You Know that the TMK Has Been Decoded Add section 31_4.10.3.5 Other
Issues Add section 31_4.10.3.6
Data Requirements for Decoding Add section 31_4.10.3.6.1
Information From the Change Key Add section 31_4.10.3.6.2
If the Change Key is a Master Key Add section 31_4.10.3.6.3 Information from a Change Key and
Master Key Add section 31_4.10.3.7
Inferences and Assumptions About the TMK or Master Key Add section 31_4.10.4
Decoding a Target Cylinder Add section 31.4.10.4.1 Variables
in the Process Add section 31_4.10.4.2 Tactical
Considerations in the Decoding Process Add section 31_4.10.4.3 Decoding
Methods Add section 31_4.10.4.3.1
Decode the TMK With a Change Key In One Session; Add section 31_4.10.4.3.2
Decode The TMK With A Change
Key In Multiple Sessions Add section 31_4.10.4.3.3
Decode The TMK With A Change Key In Multiple Sessions With Precut System
Keys Add section 31_4.10.4.3.4
Decode The TMK With A Master Key In One Session Add section 31_4.10.4.3.5
Decode The TMK With A Master
Key In Multiple Sessions Add section 31_4.10.4.3.6
Shim A cylinder Add section 31_4.10.4.3.7
Utilize The Falle Pin-and- Add section 31_4.10.6.1.3.4 Decoding the Biaxial for two
different groups of locks Add section 31_4.10.6.1.3.5 Decoding the Biaxial with
impressioning information Add section 31_4.10.6.2 Assa 7000 V10 Add section 31_4.10.6.2.1 Overview of the Assa Multiplex
system Add section 31_4.10.6.2.1.1 Comparison: Medeco biaxial and
Assa V10 Add section 31_4.10.6.2.2 Basic rules for both systems Add section 31_4.6.2.3 Blocking method Add section 31_4.10.6.2.4 Multiplex method for higher
security Add section 31_4.10.6.2.4.1 Decoding multiplex systems Add section 31_4.10.6.3 Instakey programmable lock Add section 31_4.10.6.3.1 Security issues with Instakey Add section 31_4.10.6.4 Schlage Everest cylinder Figure LSS+3143 The Easyentrie profile milling machine can
produce blanks from many sources Figure LSS+3144 The Easyentrie and Keyway King profile
milling machines Figure LSS+3145 The Medeco M3 utilizes a slider to add
another level of security Figure LSS+3146 The Medeco M3 slider is visible from
outside of the plug Figure LSS+3147 Instakey mechanism, showing how the lock
can be reprogrammed Figure LSS+3148 A comparison of Schlage Everest profiles Figure LSS_+3149 A comparison of Schlage Everest keyways
and the bypass of the undercut Figure LSS+3150 Mapping of a keyway from a digital image in
the Easyentrie Figure LSS+3151 The Assa V10 7000 series sidebar lock Figure LSS+3152 Assa V10 use of balanced and unbalanced
side millings Figure LSS+3153 Assa V10 multiplex sidebar codes Figure LSS+3154 Assa V10 sidebar code groups and keys Figure LSS+3155 Assa V10 blocking method Figure LSS+3156 Assa V10 individual sidebar coding Figure LSS+3157 Assa V10 multiplex codes Figure LSS+3158 Assa V10 multiplex codes and groups
Add section 32_3.5.5 Application of Torque to a Plug:
Medeco Cam Lock Figure LSS+3248 The Stealth Lock Systems tool to open
Medeco cam locks
Add section 37_9.4.3 FF-L-2740
Add section 39_3.1.1.0 General Defeat Strategies for
Biometric Systems Add section 39_3.1.1
Handwritten Signatures Add section 39_3.1.1.1 Automatic
Signature Recognition and Verification Add section 39_3.1.2
Face Recognition Add section 39_3.1.2.1 Defeat
of Facial Recognition Systems Add section 39_3.1.3
Fingerprints Add section 39_3.1.3.1 Defeating
Fingerprint Systems Add section 39_3.1.4
Iris Codes Add section 39_3.1.4.1 Defeat
Techniques for Iris Code Recognition Systems Add section 39_3.1.5
Voice Recognition Add section 39_3.1.5.1 Defeat
of Voice Recognition Add section 39_3.1.6
Other Systems Add section 40_1.6.1
Failure to Properly Assess and Respond Add section 40_1.6.1.1 Inspection
protocol Add section 40_1.6.1.2 Performance
tests Add section 40_1.6.1.2.1
Exterior and Interior sensors Add section 40_1.6.2
Assessment and Response Add section 40_2.1.1
Detection factors Add section 40_2.1.1.2 Sensor
applications Add section 40_2.1.3.1 Wireless
Links Add text 40_2.1.5.1 Add text 40_2.1.5.2 Add text 40_2.1.5.2.1 Add text 40_2.1.5.2.1.1 Add section 40_2.1.5.2.1.3 Wireless alarm links Add section 40_3.0.A
Electronic security methodology Add section 40_3.0A.1
Exterior Sensors Add section 40_3.0A.2
Interior sensors Add section 40_3.0.3
Definitions Add section 40_3.0.1.A System
performance Objectives Add section 40_3.0.1.B Inspection
requirements Add section 40_3.0.1.C Detection
system security and performance Add section 40_3.0.1.D Technical
considerations for each sensor Add section 40_3.0.1.E Lighting Add section 40_3.0.1.F Power
Systems Add section 40_3.0.1.F.1
Tamper Protection for power systems Add section 40_3.0.1.G Improper
installation, calibration, alignment Add section 40_3.0.1.G.1
Video systems Add section 40_3.0.1.H Testing
and maintenance Add section 40_3.0.3 Defeating Alarm Systems Add section 40_3.0.3.A Physical barriers Add section 40_3.0.3.B Detection
systems Add section 40_3.0.3.C Two-wire
devices Add section 40_3.0.3.1 Two
Wire devices Add section 40_3.0.3.2 Card Access Systems Add section 40_3.0.3.3 Hardware Rooms and Telephone
Security Add section 40_3.1.0 Defeat of Mechanical Switches Add section 40_3.1.1.1 Defeat techniques for reed switches Add section 40_3.1.1.A Balanced
magnetic switches Add section 40_3.1.1.A.1
Defeat techniques for BMS Add section 40_3.1.1A.1 Magnasphere magnetic switches Add section 40_3.1.1A.0 Defeat techniques for balanced
magnetic switch Add section 40_3.1.3.2 Defeat of Pressure Mat Sensors Add section 40_3.1.4.1 Defeat of Trip Wire Systems Add section 40_3.1.4.2 Defeat
of Trip wire systems Add section 40_3.1.6.1 Defeat
of foil glass-break material Add section 40_3.1.6.2 Defeat
of embedded wires and ribbon switches Add section 40_3.1.7.1 Defeat of Mercury Level Switches Add section 40_3.1.8.1 Defeat of taut wire systems Add section 40_3.2.2.0 Defeat of Glass Break Detectors Add section 40_3.2.3A.1 Defeat of fence vibration systems Add section 40_3.2.3B Strain sensitive cable Add section 40_3.2.3B.1 Defeat of Strain Sensitive cables Add section 40_3.2.3C Fiber optic Fence Sensors Add section 40_3.2.3C.1 Defeat of Fiber Optic or in Ground
Fence systems Add section 40_3.2.3D Defeat for perimeter fence lines Add section 40_3.2.3D.1 Defeat by bridging Add section 40_3.2.3D.2 Defeat by jumping Add section 40_3.2.3D.3 Defeat by climbing Add section 40_3.2.3D.4 Defeat by crawling Add section 40_3.2.3.3 Defeat of Vibration sensors: General
issues Add section 40_3.2.4
Defeat of wall sensors Add section 40_3.2.5.1 Defeat of Fiber Optic wall sensors Add section 40_3.2.7.1 Defeat of Ported (leaky) coax
systems Add section 40_3.2.8.1 Defeat of buried balanced pressure
sensor systems Add section 40_3.2.9.1 Defeat of Geophone systems Add section 40_3.3.1 Defeat of light sensing systems Add section 40_3.3.2 Defeat of Photoelectric systems Add section 40_3.4.0 Defeat of Proximity and Capacitance
Systems Add section 40_3.4.1.1 Defeat of E-Field systems Add section 40_3.5.1.0
Defeat of monostatic and bistatic microwave Add section 40_3.5.1.0.1 Defeat of Microwave Sensors:
General Defeats Add section 40_3.5.1.A Monostatic
units Add section 40_3.5.1.B Bistatic
units Add section 40_3.5.1.C Placement
of sensors Add section 40_3.5.1.C.1
Exterior sensors Add section 40_3.5.2.5 Defeat of Infrasonic and Ultrasonic
systems Add section 40_3.6.1.1 Defeat of Infrared systems Add section 40_3.7.2 Defeat of Video Systems Add section 40_3.7.2.1 Defeat of specific types of video
systems Add section 40_5.0 How to Steal $100,000,000: A Case
Analysis Figure LSS+4043 Magnetic switches in different
configurations Figure LSS+4044 Wires can be embedded in window screens and
act like window foil Figure LSS+4045 Contact switch arrangements Figure LSS+4046 Seismic detector Figure LSS+4047 Different types of sensors employed to
protect fences Figure LSS+4048 E Field system produced by Siemens Figure LSS+4049 A pizza cutter is utilized to protect tops
of mounting poles from climbing Figure LSS+4050 Bi-static microwave sensor array Figure LSS+4051 A thermal imaging sensor detects body heat
and movement Figure LSS+4052 Lenses for infrared sensors focus energy
onto the detector Figure LSS+4053 A blocked infrared detector is not reliable Figure LSS+4054 Video cameras may be blinded or may not see
camouflage of an intruder Figure LSS+4055 Ported coax markers should be removed Figure LSS+4056 Vibration sensors on fences should be set
to respond to hooks Figure LSS+4057 Defeat of E-Field systems Figure LSS+4058 High security facilities utilize layers of
protection against intrusion Figure LSS+4059 Coverage of a monostatic microwave system Figure LSS+4060 Diagram showing RF coverage of a ported
coax system Figure LSS+4061 Defeat of a taut wire system Figure LSS+4062 Bridging of perimeter sensors Figure LSS+4063 Jumping is a technique to bypass perimeter
sensors Figure LSS+4064 Climbing over a poorly designed fence Figure LSS+4065 Climbing over a perimeter sensor Figure LSS+4066 Beam width of a bistatic microwave system Figure LSS+4067 Sentrol balanced magnetic switch model 2707 Figure LSS+4068 x-ray view of the Sentrol 2707B balanced
magnetic switch Figure LSS+4069 A method to defeat the balanced magnetic
switch Figure LSS+4070 Intrusion detection system subsystems Figure LSS+4071 Multiplexing of alarm transmission links Figure LSS+4072 Line supervision reverse polarity Figure LSS+4073 Medium security line supervision Figure LSS+4074 Direct wire line supervision Figure LSS+4075 Data encryption line supervision Figure LSS+4076 Basic wireless transmission link
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multimedia additions in the form of audio or video
FF-L-2740
Federal Specification for Combination Locks